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Hirth: Hirth: We Were Only Teasing:

We Were Only Teasing: The Eighth Circuit

Misses the Quintessence of Hostile Work
Environment Claims Under the ADA
Shaver v. Independent Stave Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
followed the lead of two of its sister circuits 2 by holding for the first time that a
hostile work environment is actionable under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. 3 In announcing its rule, the court followed the analytical framework of
hostile work environment claims actionable under Title VII. 4 However, the
court's test for hostile work environment claims under the ADA within the
Eighth Circuit has one fewer element than the test employed by the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits in the same cause of action.5 Moreover, the disability discrimination test has one fewer element than the sexual discrimination test from Eighth
Circuit Title VII cases from which the disability discrimination test was borrowed. 6 In other words, suing for hostile work environment under the ADA is
not only allowed within the Eighth Circuit, but it is easier to prove than the
same cause of action in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and easier to prove than
racial discrimination within the Eighth Circuit. Because it is unlikely that the
court intended a lesser burden for ADA plaintiffs than for Title VII plaintiffs,
the holding of Shaver v. Independent Stave Co. is probably erroneous and
should be viewed with skepticism.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
When he was thirteen years old, Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Shaver
("Shaver") was diagnosed with epilepsy. 7 He began receiving Social Security
disability in 1991 and eventually underwent a series of operations to remove
part of his brain and implant three metal plates in his skull. 8 These operations
1. 350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2003).
2. See Flowers v. S. Reg'I Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232-35 (5th Cir.
2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2001).
3. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 719-20.
4. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
7. Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., No. 4:01-CV-1354 CAS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5331, *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2003), aj/d in part & rev'd in part, 350 F.3d 716 (8th
Cir. 2003).
8. Id. at *3.
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allowed Shaver to manage his epilepsy with medication, and he
9 was taken off
mechanic.
disability in 1995 when he began working as an auto
°
In 1998, Shaver took a job with Salem Wood Products Company' ("Independent Stave") as an Optimizer.1 1 In June of that year, he was injured at
2
work and taken to the hospital by his supervisor.' During this emergency, the
supervisor evidently learned of the metal plates in Shaver's bead and reported
3
this personal fact to Independent Stave employees on his return to the mill.
Soon thereafter Shaver's coworkers and supervisors began referring to him as
"Platehead."' 14 Although he told them that he preferred not to be teased or given
two years. 15
pejorative nicknames, the jibes continued for the next
16
The following year, Shaver injured his right index finger at work. This
began a nearly year-long series of absences, work restrictions, temporary total
disability payments, and reprimands.' 7 On September 23, 2000, Shaver was
18
called home in the middle of his shift to deal with a sick child. He claimed
that he had permission to leave from his assistant supervisor; however, when he
returned an hour and a half later, his shift supervisor, Charles Bacon, gave him
9. Id.
10. Shaver's suit was filed against Independent Stave Company doing business
as Salem Wood Products, Inc., and Salem Wood Products Company. Because the
lower court granted Independent Stave's motion for summary judgment, it did not
reach the issue of whether Independent Stave and Salem were in fact the same company. Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 725 (8th Cir. 2003). The court of
appeals directed this question to be resolved on remand. Id.
11. Salem converts oak logs into staves and headers for bourbon barrels which it
then sends to Independent Stave Co. Shaver, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5331, at *3.
Shaver checked and marked defects in the logs with a computer so the cutters could
get the most board feet out of a single log. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *34.
14. Id. at *4.
15. Id. In addition to being called "Platehead," Shaver was labeled as "stupid"
and accused of "not playing with a full deck." Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720. One coworker
even suggested out of Shaver's presence that Shaver "pissed in his pants when the
microwave was on." Id. at 721.
16. Shaver, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5331, at *4.
17. Id.at *4.Shaver's hand was injured on November 17, 1999. Id. He was
given a written warning for excessive absences on March 15, 2000. Id. On March 27,
he returned to full work duty but pain in his finger prevented him from working effectively. Id. He was threatened with a three-day suspension on April 19 for not working
and procured a doctor's note prohibiting use of his right hand until he consulted a
specialist. Id. He received four days of temporary total disability after which the hand
specialist restricted his work to one-handed duty until he could be operated on. Id. at
*4-5. Shaver had surgery on May 9 and was placed on temporary total disability again
until May 22. Id. at *5.He returned to work but was not released for full duty by the
hand specialist until July 31. Id. A September 1 report listed Shaver's hand as permanently injured and possibly requiring future surgery. Id.
18. Id. at *5.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/11
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a written warning and a three day suspension for leaving work without permission. 19 Shaver shoved the papers back at Bacon and stormed out. 20 When Bacon reported the incident to Michael
Transano, the mill manager, Transano
21
fired Shaver for insubordination.
In January 2001, Shaver filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC
claiming harassment, failure to accommodate his hand injury, and discharge
due to disability. 22 In May, he applied for work with two small companies, both
of which were owned by acquaintances of his. 23 Shaver gave Charles Bacon's
name as a reference but when both prospective employers called, Bacon told
them that he couldn't recommend Shaver because Shaver had a "get-rich-quick
scheme" of suing the companies for whom he had worked.24 Shaver was not
hired by either company. 25 Shaver subsequently filed additional claims against
Independent Stave for retaliation resulting from his earlier complaint with the
26
EEOC and his attempt to file for worker's compensation for his hand injury.
These claims ripened into the present lawsuit under the anti-harassment
and anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA, as well as a supplemental claim for
worker's comp. 27 The harassment claim was premised on a theory of hostile
work environment which, for the sake of summary judgment, the district court
assumed was actionable under the ADA. The retaliation claim was based on
the negative job references Charles Bacon gave to each of Staver's prospective
employers, grounds the court also found to be actionable under the ADA. 29 On
both claims, however, the district court granted Independent Stave's motion for
summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the worker's
compensation claim. The court held that
the frequent reference to [Shaver] as 'Platehead,' both to him and behind his back, may have been insulting, mean-spirited, and unprofessional, but, as a matter of law, was not so severe and extreme that a reasonable person would 3find
that the terms and conditions of his employ1
ment had been altered.

19. Id. at *5-6.

20. Id. at *6.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *6-7.
25. Id. at *7.
26. Id.
27. Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
28. Shaver, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5331, at *16.
29. Id. at *19.
30. Id. at *17, 20, 21-22.
31. Id. at *17.
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And although Bacon had given bad references in retaliation for Shaver's suit,
the court found that no "reasonable jury could find in favor of Shaver on this
claim because the evidence point[ed] overwhelmingly to the conclusion that
Shaver manufactured this claim by asking his acquaintances to call Bacon for a
knowing that Bacon would in all probability give a negative
job reference,
32
one."
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the hostile
work environment claim but reversed and remanded the claim for retaliation,
holding that negative job references could state a cause of action under the
ADA for retaliation even if Shaver "manufactured" the opportunity for Bacon
to give him a bad recommendation. 33 Although the court of appeals rejected
Shaver's hostile work environment on factual grounds, it held for the first time
that such a claim is actionable under the ADA,34 joining only the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits 35 in doing so.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act in order "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 36 That mandate provided that
"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of emcompensation,
37
ployment."
The ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.",3 8 The Act further enumerates a list of actions that constitute discrimination. 39 Nowhere in this list or in any other provision of the ADA is there any
32. Id. at *20.
33. Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 723-25 (8th Cir. 2003).
34. Id. at 719-20.
35. See Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232-35 (5th Cir.
2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2001).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
37. Id. § 12112(a).
38. Id. § 12102(2). See Sutton v United Air Lines, Inc. (1999) 527 U.S. 471
(1999) (holding that the determination of whether an individual has a disability must
be an individualized inquiry); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (creating
a three-step inquiry to consider (1) whether a condition constituted a physical impairment, (2) what major life activity was hindered by such impairment, and (3)
whether that major life activity was "substantially limited" by the impairment).
39. See42 U.S.C. § 12112(b):
Construction. As used in subsection (a), the term "discriminate" includeshttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/11
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definition of discrimination that includes a hostile work environment. Nevertheless, most district courts have indicated a willingness to allow actions for a
hostile work environment under the ADA as long as the environment was
"egregiously hostile.'4 1 These same courts, however, have almost systemati(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a
way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or
employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that
has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this title (such
relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral
agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs);
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified
individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the
qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association;
(5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee
who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is
based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or
a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related
for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the
most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a
job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test
purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual,
or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills
are the factors that the test purports to measure).
Id.
40. See id.
41. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with PsychiatricDisabilities,
Employment Discriminationand the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA. L. REV.
271, 292 (2000).
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cally granted summary judgment to defendants for lack of sufficient evidence,
42
4
thus allowing most courts of appeals to avoid the issue. Until 2001 , those
appellate courts that had considered the issue assumed, as had the district
courts, that an action for hostile work environment was cognizable under the
ADA but denied the claims for lack of evidence. 44 Not until the Fifth Circuit
decided Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services45 did any of the
courts of appeals explicitly recognize an action for hostile work environment
under the ADA.4 6 The Fourth Circuit followed suit less than a month later in
Fox v. General Motors Corp. With Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., the
Eighth Circuit becomes the third federal circuit court of appeals to recognize
hostile work environment actions under the ADA.
A. Hostile Work Environments Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In 1971, the Fifth Circuit was the first to recognize claims for hostile work
environment in Rogers v. EEOC.4 8 The Rogers court held that a Hispanic employee could establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer
created an offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory
service to its Hispanic clientele. 49 The court noted that the phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in Title VII "is an expansive concept which
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination .... One can readily
envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers .. .
Other courts applied the Rogers court's reasoning to discrimination based
on religion,5 1 national origin,5 2 and sex. 53 Of sex discrimination, the Eleventh
Circuit noted,

42. Leah C. Myers, Disability Harassment:How Far Should the ADA Follow in
the Footsteps of Title VII?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 265, 266 (2003).
43. See Flowers v. S. Reg'I Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232-35 (5th Cir.
2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2001).
44. See, e.g., Vollmert v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir.
1999); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir.
1999); Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1998);
McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998).
45. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
46. Id. at 235.
47. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
48. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. Id. at 238.
50. Id.
51. See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/11
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Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living 54can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Indeed, much of the litigation concerning hostile work environments has
involved sexual discrimination, prompting the United States Supreme Court to
develop an analytical framework for hostile work environment claims in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 55 In that case, Vinson was hired as a teller-trainee
at what would become Meritor Savings Bank by Vice-President Sidney Taylor
in 1974.56 In the following four years, she was promoted to teller, head teller,
and assistant branch manager based solely on merit. 57 In September 1978, Vinson took indefinite sick leave and was fired two months later. 58 She subsequently sued the bank and Taylor for "constantly... subject[ing her] to sexual
harassment" during her four years at the bank. 59 She argued that Taylor's conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which makes it "'an
unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'60
The Supreme Court agreed with Vinson, noting that "[w]ithout question,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." 6 ' The Court premised
its ruling on EEOC guidelines which included "'[unwelcome] sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature"' among the possible violations of Title VII. 62 Such conduct would violate Title VII, said the Court, "whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or
denial of an economic quid pro quo, where 'such conduct has the purpose or
or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
63
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."'
52. See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th
Cir. 1977).
53. See Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 902.
55. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 63 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000)) (alteration in original).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985)).
63. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (1985)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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Not all workplace harassment "affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of
employment within the meaning of Title VII," however. 64 Therefore, the Court
held that "[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment."' 65 This holding was clarified in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., seven years later.66 In that case, the Court required
a totality of circumstances test to determine whether a work environment was
hostile so as to warrant relief under Title VII. 6 7 It noted that "[t]he effect on the
employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining
whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no
single factor is required., 68 Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion defined the
inquiry in hostile work environment cases as "whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance., 69 To
demonstrate interference, the plaintiff need not show a decline in productivity,
but only "that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct
would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working condi7
tions as 'to ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.' 1
B. Title VII and the ADA

As noted earlier, many courts assumed that the hostile work environment
framework could apply to claims under the ADA, but few such cases survived
summary judgment. 7' The basis for applying a framework developed in the context of racial or sexual discrimination to cases of disability discrimination was not
simply that discrimination is discrimination, as "even broad, remedial statutes
such as the ADA do not give federal courts a license to create causes of action
after the manner of the common law.' 72 Rather, the willingness of courts to extend the cause of action from one statute to the other was grounded in the language of both statutes.73
In Flowers v. Southern RegionalPhysicianServices, Inc., 74 the Fifth Circuit
first noted that no other circuit had expressly recognized a cause of action under
64. Id. at 67.
65. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982)) (alteration in
original).
66. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858
F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
71. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
72. Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003).
73. Id.
74. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/11
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the ADA for hostile work environment, but several had suggested it could be
75
allowed. Because the case before it was not so easily disposed of at summary
76
judgment, the Fifth Circuit decided to hear the issue and rule once and for all.
First, the court noted that the ADA's mandate that no covered entity "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment," 77 was identical to language in Title VII making it an unlawful employment practice "for an employer. . . 'to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, orprivileges ofemployment.' 78
The parallel language was significant since, prior to the passage of the
ADA, the Supreme Court had held that the language from Title VII provided a
cause of action for "harassment [which is] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working envi79
ronment ...because it affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment.,
Finding the similar language of both Title VII and the ADA "dictates a consistent
reading of the two statutes," the Fifth Circuit interpreted the phrase 'terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,' as it is used in the ADA, to 'strike at'
harassment in the workplace." 80 Thus, it would be "illogical to hold that ADA
disabled individuals
language identical to that of Title VII was intended to afford
'81
less protection than those groups covered by Title VII.
In addition to having similar language, both Title VII and the ADA "are
also alike in their purposes and remedial structures. Both Title VII and the ADA
are aimed at the same evil-employment discrimination against individuals of

75. Id. at 232. See Casper v. Gunite Corp., No. CIV.A.99-3215, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16241, (7th Cir. July 11, 2000) ("Such a cause of action appears to exist because the ADA prohibits discrimination in the 'terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment,' which is the exact same language that the Supreme Court relied upon in
finding that Title VII encompasses claims of sex discrimination due to the creation of
a hostile work environment in Meritor." (citations omitted)); Silk v. City of Chicago,
194 F.3d 788, 803 (7th Cir. 1999); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 666
(3d Cir. 1999) ("This framework indicates that a cause of action for harassment exists
under the ADA."); Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998);
Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Such a
claim [of a hostile work environment under the ADA] would seem to arise under the
general prohibition against discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment contained in § 12112(a).").
76. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233.
77. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)) (emphasis added) (alteration in
original).
78. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)) (emphasis added).
79. Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989))
(alterations in original).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga.
1995)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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certain classes." 82 Thus the court held that, "because Title VII has been extended
to hostile work environment claims, we follow the growing consensus that our
harassment jurisprudence be extended to claims of disability-based harassment.
As such, we find8 3that a cause of action for disability-based harassment is viable
under the ADA."
Less than a month later, the Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion in
Fox v. GeneralMotors Corp.8 4 Following almost the exact same analysis as the
Flowers court had, the Fox court compared the nearly identical language of Title
VII and the ADA and presumed that Congress was aware of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" when it chose
to use the same language in the ADA.8 5 Indeed the presumption is not even necessary to reach this conclusion, noted the court, as the ADA itself provides that
"'the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [Title VII] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures [the ADA] provides."' 86 The Fourth Circuit also
noted that other courts had "routinely used Title VII precedents in ADA cases"
because "the ADA echoes and expressly refers to Title VII, and because the two
statutes have the same purpose-the prohibition of illegal discrimination in employment."8 7 Finally, the court found that interpreting the ADA in accord with
Title VII was "sanctioned by the EEOC, whose regulations implementing the
ADA state that 'it is unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, harass or interfere
with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or pro' 88
tected by' the employment provisions of the ADA.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Shaver appealed Independent Stave's successful motion for summary
judgment to the Eighth Circuit.8 9 After discussing the facts of the case, 90 Judge
82. Id. at 234.
83. Id. at 234-35.
84. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 175-76.
86. Id. at 176 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000)).
87. Id. See Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir.
1996) ("[fIn analyzing claims under the ADA, it is appropriate to borrow from our
approach to the respective analog under Title VII."); Newman v. GHS Osteopathic,
Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[I]t follows that the methods and manner of
proof under one statute should inform the standards under the other[] as well."). See
also Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VII causation standards apply in ADA cases); Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc.,
53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding Title VII burden shifting rules apply in ADA
cases).
88. Fox, 247 F.3d at 176 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12(b) (2001)) (alteration in
original).
89. Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2003)
90. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/11

10

2005]

Hirth: Hirth: We Were Only Teasing:
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

Morris Sheppard Arnold, writing for the court, noted that the Eighth Circuit had
previously hinted that it was possible to bring a hostile work environment claim
under the ADA but that it had never expressly held so. 91 Following the leads of
two sister circuits, the court then held that such a claim was cognizable under
the ADA.92
The court began its analysis with the observation that "[e]ven broad, remedial statutes such as the ADA do not give federal courts a license to create
causes of action after the manner of the common law." 93 Therefore the court
turned to the language of the ADA itself, finding that "'no covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ...terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.' 94 Although the language said nothing about hostile work environments, the court looked to how the text was understood at the time of its
passage in order to construe its meaning. 95 The court noted that Congress had
borrowed the "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" language directly from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 It also noted that other
appellate courts had construed the Title VII language to create an action based
on a hostile work environment since 197197 and that the U.S. Supreme Court
98
had adopted this reading in 1986. The Eighth Circuit therefore concluded that
Congress was aware of the usage of the phrase and included it as "a legal term
a broad range of employment practices, including workof art that prohibited
99
place harassment."
The court then turned to the requirements to sustain a hostile work environment claim under the ADA, borrowing standards from other areas of antidiscrimination law.1°° In doing so, the court enumerated four elements: the
plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he was
subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was due to his
membership in that class, and (4) that the harassment was severe enough to
employment.1° It then examaffect the terms, conditions, or privileges of 0his
2
case.'
ined each of these elements in Shaver's

91. Id. (citing Jeseritz v. Potter, 282 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 2002)).
92. Id. (citing Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232-35
(5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2001)).
93. Id. at 720 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001)).
94. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)) (alteration in original).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1971)).
98. Id. (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 907-08 (8th
Cir. 2003)).
102. Id. at 720-23.
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As to the first element, the court found that Shaver was indeed a member
of a protected class.' 0 3 Neither party contested that Shaver was qualified to
perform his job at the Salem lumber mill. 0 4 While the defendant did contest
whether Shaver was "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, the court
found two ways in which he qualified as "disabled."'0 5 First, in order to be
considered disabled, one may prove that she suffers a physical or mental "'impairment that substantially limits one or more.., major life activities."" 0 6 Secondly, one can also qualify under the ADA if she "is regarded (accurately or
inaccurately) as having such an impairment or if [she] has a record of such an
impairment in the past.' ' 07 In both cases, Shaver qualified. His epilepsy caused
seizures, which the Eighth Circuit has previously held to impair "major life
activities" such as speaking, walking, or seeing, and thus Shaver had a record of
impairment.0 8 Moreover, the record showed that his coworkers regarded him
as "stupid" and "not playing with a full deck" because of his condition. 0 9 Since
thinking is a major life activity, the court held that Shaver could have been
regarded as having a disability as well." 0
The second element of extant harassment was also decided in Shaver's
favor, given his nickname of"platehead."' The third element of a causal relationship between the harassment and disability was disputed by Independent
Stave on the grounds that "platehead" referred to Shaver's operation, not his
epilepsy. 12 The court wasted little time dismissing this distinction as "too fine
for us," and noted that "[e]ven if one calls a person 'pegleg' because he has a
peg leg rather than because he has trouble walking, it is nevertheless
the case
' 3
that the nickname was chosen because the person was disabled." "
The real issue in the case, therefore, was whether the harassment suffered
by Shaver was severe enough to alter the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of
his employment.1 4 The court noted that "rude, abrasive, unkind, or insensitive
[conduct] does not come within the scope of the law"; only behavior "'severe
and pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment"' is actionable." t5 While a jury could easily have believed that Shaver
himself found his work environment hostile, the court held that even assuming
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 720 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000)) (alteration in original).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C)).
Id. (citing Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Id.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 721.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)) (emphasis added).
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all facts in his favor, a jury could not conclude that the harassment rose to the
level required by the Title VII cases upon which this analogous cause of action
was based. 116
To bolster his otherwise weak evidence of an objectively hostile work environment, Shaver also argued that he would not have been harassed had his
medical information not been disclosed to his co-workers by his supervisor
without his authorization. 1 7 The court did not decide whether disclosure of a
disability by an employer was itself a violation of the ADA because Shaver did
not plead the disclosure as a separate incident of harassment. 1 8 However, it did
note that disclosure of a disability and harassment based on that disability involved different interests.' 1 9 The discrimination claim is statutory and actionable only by a "qualified individual with a disability," while disclosure of medical information is a privacy tort and one need not be disabled to sue for such an
offense. In essence, Shaver argued that discrimination not violating the ADA
by itself could become actionable if it resulted from an unauthorized
disclosure. 121The court rejected this argument, finding that "Medical privacy is
not a 'term, condition, or privilege' of ...employment" because, "[i]n the absence of a statute, there is nothing to forbid an at-will employer from condition' 22
ing employment on the ability to disclose otherwise private information."'
Even if another provision of the ADA prohibited such disclosures, Shaver had
not sued under that provision and the court would not allow him to do "an endrun around his own procedural default by using such a claim to transform unactionable harassment into something actionable."' 23 In the end, the court upheld
summary judgment because the harassment, while potentially actionable under
the ADA, did not rise to the level necessary to be objectively hostile or abusive.
V.

COMMENT

In Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., the Eighth Circuit became the third
federal court of appeals to hold that an action for hostile work environment was
actionable under the ADA.124 However, the Shaver decision differs from its
116. Id. at 721-22. See Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906,
909-10 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding a hostile work environment claim based on death
threats directed specifically at the plaintiff over a sustained period of time); Smith v.
St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding a suit based on
verbal abuse where the supervisor had repeatedly singled the plaintiff out and the
plaintiff had been hospitalized twice as a result of the psychological trauma).
117. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 722.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 722-23.
122. Id. at 723.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 719.
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predecessors in one important way: where the Fourth and Fifth Circuits had
enumerated five elements' 25 necessary to make out the cause of action, the
Eighth Circuit enumerated only four. 126 While the high standard set in Shaver
for the requisite evidence necessary to show a hostile work environment may
prove difficult for future plaintiffs to meet, the action may ultimately be easier
to prove in the Eighth Circuit than in the Fourth and Fifth. Indeed, in the Eighth
Circuit it may also be easier to prove a hostile work environment under the
ADA than under Title VII.
The Shaver court announced four elements: (1)the plaintiff is a member
of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome harassment,
(3) the harassment was due to his membership in that class, and (4) the harassment was severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his
employment.127 These elements are the same as the first four announced in
Flowers.' 28 However, the Flowers court also required a plaintiff to prove "(5)
that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take prompt remedial action." 129 The Fourth Circuit also requires this fifth element, holding that "an ADA plaintiff must prove ...(5) some factual basis...

to impute liability for the harassment to the employer."' 30 Nowhere in the
Eighth Circuit opinion is this fifth element present, a fact that might have profound implications for disability discrimination cases in the Eighth Circuit.
In Shaver, the Eighth Circuit upheld summary judgment because the
plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the harassment he suffered was objectively hostile enough to warrant relief under the ADA.131 But supposing Shaver
had proven his work environment were objectively hostile, there is no requirement in the opinion that Independent Stave even needed to be aware of the
harassment before being held liable! Even if all the harassment had been done
secretly by a coworker, and the management of Independent Stave had been
justifiably ignorant of it, the company would still be liable as long as the harassment were bad enough. This is a troubling result for employers within the
Eighth Circuit.
More troubling is that the Eighth Circuit was not unaware of this fifth
element when it announced its rule. Setting out the four elements of its decision, the Shaver court wrote, "In determining whether a hostile work environment claim has been made out under the ADA, we think it proper to turn to
standards developed elsewhere in our anti-discrimination law, adapting them to
the unique requirements of the ADA."' 32 After setting out the four elements of
125. Flowers v. S. Reg' Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232-35 (5th Cir.
2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2001).
126. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720.
127. Id.
128. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235.
129. Id. at 235-36.
130. Fox, 247 F.3d at 177.
131. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 721-22.
132. Id. at 720.
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its new test for hostile work environment claims under the ADA, the court cites
Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc.,' 33 an Eighth Circuit Title VII racial
harassment case. However, the Reedy court applied the five element test followed in Fox and Flowers:
to prevail on his hostile work environment claim Mr. Reedy must show
that he was a member of a protected group, that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, that the harassment was because of his membership in the group, that the harassment affected a term, condition, or
privilege of his employment, and that Quebecor knew or should have
harassment butfailed to take prompt and effective reknown about the
34
action.'
medial
The five element test has been used consistently for Title VII cases within the
Eighth Circuit.' 35
If Title VII precedents are indeed the model for hostile work environment
claims under the ADA, then the Eighth Circuit either omitted the fifth element
of employer knowledge accidentally or intentionally. Given the court's language that "we think it proper to turn to standards developed elsewhere in our
antidiscrimination law, adapting them to the unique requirements of the
'136
one could argue that the adaptation mentioned was the omission of
ADA,"
the fifth element. This conclusion is not satisfactory, however, since it opens up
employers to greater liability for disability discrimination than for sexual discrimination.
The only other interpretation is that the Eighth Circuit inadvertently erred
by omitting the fifth element of knowledge. It could be argued that since Shaver
could not prove the fourth element-an objectively abusive environment hostile
enough to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment-the court
had no need to consider the fifth element of knowledge and therefore did not
enumerate it. But that reasoning essentially results in reading the entire holding
of Shaver v. Independent Stave Co. as dicta since, strictly speaking, it was not
necessary for the court to enumerate any elements to affirm summary judgment
other than evidence of objective hostility. Indeed, in all previous ADA hostile
work environment cases, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant employer without handing down any rule as to the elements of the
133. 333 F.3d 906, 907-08 (8th Cir. 2003)
134. Id. at 908 (emphasis added).
135. See Rheineck v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., 261 F.3d 751, 755-56 (8th Cir.
2001) ("To succeed on a sexual harassment claim for a hostile work environment, a
plaintiff must show that (1)she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on sex, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take proper
remedial action.").
136. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720 (emphasis added).
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cause of action.' 37 The court could have done the same here. Instead, the Eighth
Circuit handed down a rule that does not comport with either its own discrimination jurisprudence or that of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits from whom it purportedly borrowed its analysis.
This decision, if read literally, would hold employers liable for the actions

of their employees even absent constructive knowledge of the actionable behavior. Such strict liability for employers in disability discrimination cases
would be inconsistent with the knowledge requirement (actual or imputed) in
sexual discrimination cases. Therefore, the decision should not be read to allow
such a cause of action without some evidence of the employer's culpability.
The only other option is to read the rule announced in Shaver as dicta and require the court to enumerate a new test with all five elements when it hears
another case for which the environment is objectively hostile. Any other result
will unjustly imperil employers within the Eighth Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because Shaver announces a rule inconsistent with the precedent upon
which it was based, it should be viewed with skepticism. Further, the rule allows for a kind of strict employer liability for disability discrimination where
no such liability is found in either racial or sexual discrimination cases. Finally
the imposition of such strict liability almost certainly exceeds Congress's intent
in protecting the disabled from discrimination.
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit's omission was harmless error in the instant
case: those harassing Shaver included his supervisors, a fact that would satisfy
the fifth element of the Fourth or Fifth Circuit rule requiring employer knowledge. Moreover, the addition of this fifth element would not have changed the
fact that the discrimination faced by Shaver did not rise to the level necessary to
state a claim under the ADA. But when the next case involving more egregious
behavior comes before the courts of the Eighth Circuit, it will be error to follow
the rule announced in Shaver v. Independent Stave Co. For that reason, the

four-element test for a hostile work environment cause of action under the
ADA should be read as dicta and ignored.
J. ANDREW HIRTH

137. See Jeseritz v. Potter, 282 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 2002).
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